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context. A large section addresses the specific question of the 
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For a long-time, the fiscal question was not at all seen as a potential 
economic policy or a viable economic tool. It was, indeed, more a 
national accounting topic than a policy one. Monetary policy has far 
more historical roots, having been studied a lot earlier  by Jean 
Bodin, John Law, the Mercantilists, and the Physiocrats, to cite a 
few. Ironically, “monetary indiscipline” could be  seen as an 
effective policy due to the difficulty to define it, when “fiscal 
indiscipline” was always easy to notice and, compellingly, led to 
nations’ bankruptcy. On the monetary side, money could create an 
illusion or not – the proponents of this theory were not in favor of a 
100% reserve system – and was, in this regard, considered  to be a 
veil (See entry on Monetary Policy Practices). Because fiscal policy 
entails notions such as revenue, spending, deficit or surplus, it 
seems that a fiscal illusion could not prevail as it did for the 
monetary policy. In other words, without illusion, no policies. 
 
Nevertheless, the study of fiscal policy stemmed from the debate on 
the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of a public deficit. Its roots 
reach to the origin of macroeconomics devised by Keynes in 1936. 
 
Associated with monetary and structural policies, fiscal policy is 
one of the three levers a government may use to impact its 
economy. 
The three ingredients in this cocktail require wise and precise 
dosages. 
 
Each of these three definitions can be broken down in sub-
categories. Fiscal policy consists of two elements: tax revenues and 
government spending. 
 
Tax revenues are the result of economic activity and the level of tax 
rates. Tax rates are decided by the government, as well as some 
conditions for abatements in order to create incentives or 
disincentives to produce certain goods and services. For example, 
abatements can be allowed if a firm abides by an environmental 
friendly way of producing. The several abatements make the Warin: International Fiscal Policy Practices  3 
concept of tax rates unclear. Mendoza and Tesar (1998) have 
created a proxy to measure the actual tax rate applied to a specific 
part of the economy: the implicit tax rate. This shows the 
breakdown of fiscal policy into several different other levers. In 
retrospect, we find that not only the amount of money raised will 
affect the economy, but also how the money is raised. 
 
On the spending side, government spending consists of two factors 
that will also  have major effects on the economy: the size of the 
spending, as well as how the public budget is spent, or which 
sectors of the economy are favored by the spending. Indeed the 
government may favor public investment, education, or social 
welfare. The transmission channel being different for each of these 
spending categories, the impact on the economy will be different. 
 
In both situations  - tax revenues or government spending - the 
government should look for the most effective way to raise or spend 
money. In other words, if an increase in GDP is the primary focus, 
the government should look to target the best sub-categories in 
either the revenue side and/or the spending side of the public 
budget.  
 
One criterion to use is the multiplier. According to Hall and Papell 
(2005), the multiplier is “the amount by which GDP is higher in an 
economy with a higher level of government purchases in 
comparison to an otherwise identical economy with lower 
government purchases.” 
 
A budget deficit exists when the sum of government spending, 
government transfers to the private sector, and interest on the 
government debt, is less than the amount raised through taxation. 
The national debt is the sum of all the budget deficits and surpluses. 
 
A government issues bonds to finance its budget deficit. A cost-
benefit analysis can be drawn from this point: the issuance of bonds 
will impact the national interest rate by raising it. On the one hand, 
the national economy will bear the cost in terms of the reduction of 
investments. On the other hand, the government purchases and the 
public investment will positively affect the  GDP by raising it in 
proportion to the multiplier. Hence, broadly speaking, if the Warin: International Fiscal Policy Practices  4 
multiplier’s effect is greater than the slowdown  in investment, the 
budget deficit is an effective fiscal policy. In fact, there is one more 
dimension to this analysis: time.   A rising interest rate due to a 
higher deficit will have a lagged impact of a couple of months, or 
maybe years, since it takes some time before the investments 
materialize into new goods and services. However, the public 
expenses will almost immediately materialize. This is where it is 
important to make the distinction between cyclical versus stru ctural 
deficits as well as… political cycles. 
 
The government budget deficit is likely to be higher ceteris paribus 
during recessions. Indeed, by definition, expenditures rise and 
receipts fall. Moreover, the automatic stabilizers (unemployment 
benefits, etc.) exacerbate the different changes of the deficit during 
a recession. When the economy is in a slump, the budget deficit is 
large. When the economy is expanding, the budget is in surplus. 
 
Brown (1956) developed the concept of full-employment deficit to 
adjust for cyclical effects. He showed that the deficits observed in 
the early 1930s in the U.S. were actually large surpluses in the full-
employment deficit. The full-employment deficit is the deficit that 
would occur if the economy were at full employment. In other 
words, the full-employment deficit takes out the cyclical effects on 
the budget deficit. In more recent years, the concept of the full-
employment deficit has usually been discussed by distinguishing 
between the structural and cyclical parts of the deficit. The 
structural deficit is the same thing as the full-employment deficit, 
and the cyclical deficit is the difference between the actual deficit 
and the structural deficit. 
 
The result of new public expenses will depend on the initial 
conditions: if the economy was in recession due to a lack of 
demand, the suppliers will benefit from this fiscal policy since some 
of them will now not go bankrupt because of the change in demand.  
If the economy was not in a slump, however, one can expect the 
supply to fit well with the demand. In such a case, the new public 
expenses may create inflationary pressures, at least in the short-run,  
if supply is inelastic. 
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This is where the policy -mix between monetary policy and fiscal 
policy is a relevant notion to a nalyze. When the government 
purchases more goods, the increase in government demand 
increases GDP through the multiplier. But, the increase in GDP 
increases the demand for money: more money is needed for 
transaction purposes. If the central bank or the authority in charge 
of the monetary policy does not change the money supply, the 
interest rate must be  increased to offset the increase in money 
demand resulting from the increase in GDP. This increase in the 
interest rate reduces investment demand and net exports, offsetting 
some of the stimulus to GDP caused by government spending. The 
offsetting negative effect is called crowding out. However, as 
aforementioned, time is a key concept in the actual assessment of 
the different effects of these policies.  
 
Moreover, the policy-mix concept is broader than just an economic 
approach; it embodies a political dimension too. In western 
economies the monetary policy is usually managed by an 
independent central bank whose primary target is the stability of 
inflation [see entry on Monetary Policy Practices]. The fiscal 
policy, however, is managed by the government. Indeed, neither 
policies exist in a vacuum. The monetary policy will have impacts 
on the government’s fiscal decisions.  The main instrument of 
central banks is the refinancing interest rate. The determination of 
this interest rate will increase or decrease the burden of the deficit, 
and may change the government’s mind-set on running or not 
running a budget deficit. Conversely, the decision to run a budget 
deficit will put pressure  on interest rates, and will remove some 
degrees of freedom for the monetary authorities. 
 
This shows how important it is to regard the government and the 
central bank in terms of leader and follower. Furthermore, the 
credibility of the different policy announcements made by both 
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2. Fiscal Policy in Theory 
 
The early ages: Keynesianism versus monetarism also in fiscal 
policy 
During the 1930s, using a quantity theory framework, the Chicago 
economists argued in favor of the use of the fiscal policy to absorb 
the changes in the business cycle. They favored the use of the fiscal 
policy to the use of the monetary policy for stabilization purposes. 
Later they abandoned the notion of a counter cyclical fiscal policy 
as a principal recommendation. Monetary policy became more 
important than fiscal policy. According to Warburton (1945), fiscal 
policy combined monetary policy and government expenditures, 
however, only the former was relevant. Government expenditure 
was perceived as merely a substitute for individual expenditure and 
had no additional effect on the level of activity. 
 
With almost the same timbre as the early Chicago view, and prior to 
the elaboration of his General Theory, Keynes (1936) advocated in 
favor of public expenditure as a means to economic improvement. 
Keynes (1936) defended this analysis based on the multiplier. The 
idea was to show that, under less than full-employment conditions, 
an increase in expenditures could  increase income r ather than 
prices. This analysis was based upon two core ideas that he 
developed consecutively. First, money wages were rigid, and 
second, unemployment could be traced to  disequilibrium between 
investment and savings. Keynes thought that the rigidity of money 
wages was part of the institutional transformation that the European 
economies had undergone following the First World War. This 
assumption came to the forefront of Keynes thinking after the return 
of Britain to the gold standard in April 1925. 
 
With the publication of the General Theory, it became apparent that 
Keynes not only considered the concept of fiscal policy as a 
corrective device, but also a way to preserve economic stability. 
The General Theory divided economic categories of final demand 
into two types of expenditures: those related to income 
(consumption) and those independent of income (investment). 
Keynes demonstrated that investment must equal planned full 
employment savings. As a result, public intervention was desired to Warin: International Fiscal Policy Practices  7 
promote investment. Increasing the scale of investment had clear 
precedence over expanding the level of consumption. 
 
Keynes’ analysis of budget and fiscal policies followed the logic of 
the General Theory by creating categories; he separated the public 
budget into two items: a current budget (government consumption) 
and a capital budget (government investment). 
 
The division between a capital and an ordinary budget allowed 
Keynes to discern two types of fiscal policy: deficit budgeting 
(deficit finance) and capital budgeting. Deficit budgeting is a means 
to tone down a disequilibrium, whereas capital budgeting is aimed 
at maintaining equilibrium. The current budget was used as a way to 
stabilize the cycle. Rather, the current budget should show a 
surplus, which would be transferred to the capital budget. 
 
The Modern Debate on Fiscal Policy 
We will adapt the chronology done by van der Ploeg (2004): (1) the 
classical view with the supply-side policies; (2) the Keynesian view 
with the demand-side policies; (3) the automatic stabilizers versus 
pro-cyclical government cutbacks approach; and (4) the Neo-
Keynesian versus New-Classical synthesis in a debate that comes 
from monetary policy studies -rules versus discretion. 
 
We begin with the classical perspective within which all m arkets 
clear without delay, and unemployment is voluntary and may be 
viewed as freely chosen leisure. Moreover, unemployment may 
mean non-market transactions, such as household services. The 
classical view gives predominance to the labour market, since it 
determines the aggregate employment and national income (van der 
Ploeg, 2004). Let’s imagine an increase in public spending only 
financed by the issuance of bonds. Since demand-side policies do 
not affect employment or national income, the classical multiplier is 
zero. Why is this so? Willing to sell bonds to the public, the 
government has to propose a higher interest rate. Hence, foreign 
bonds offer a lower return than domestic bonds. The national 
currency appreciates since capital flows into the country.  With a 
higher interest rate, money reallocated from investments towards 
consumption, and the price level rises. In retrospect, according to 
the classical view, a bond-financed fiscal policy does not enhance Warin: International Fiscal Policy Practices  8 
employment or national income. Rather, it induces a higher interest 
rate, a rise in price level, and an appreciation of the currency. 
Money is, thus, neutral. 
 
Now, if the rise in public spending is financed by taxes on labour, 
the tax wedge (the difference between what a worker costs a 
company and what a worker can spend) rises. As a consequence, 
employment and national income fall. In other words, the multiplier 
for public spending financed by taxation is negative. 
 
The Keynesian view, under which the aggregate demand for goods 
rather than the cost of labour determines employment, stands in 
contrast with the classical perspective. Prices and nominal wages 
are fixed in the short run. Time is also taken into consideration in 
Keynes’s analysis. Again, the deficit can be financed in two ways: 
bonds or taxes. A fiscal policy financed by the issuance of bonds 
sets in motion a positive multiplier process. On the contrary, if the 
increase in public spending is financed by higher taxes, the 
balanced-budget multiplier is smaller than under the bond-financed 
budget deficit. Indeed, higher taxes reduce disposable income and 
slow down private consumption. With a lower aggregate demand, 
no imports, and negligible crowding out, the balanced-budget 
multiplier is exactly one: a reduction of private spending is the 
consequence of a rise in public spending, which dampens the 
Keynesian multiplier. 
 
Another demand side approach exists within the   automatic 
stabilizers versus pro-cyclical government cutback a rgument: 
Automatic stabilizers operate counter-cyclically. In a recession 
fewer taxes are paid, which dampens the adverse effects on demand. 
During a boom, more taxes are paid and  offset some of the positive 
impacts on demand. Automatic stabilizers are more significant if the 
tax system is progressive. Such automatic stabilizers reduce the size 
of the Keynesian multiplier, thereby making fiscal policies less 
effective. 
 
Finally, with a re-birth of both classicism and Keynesianism in the 
“rules versus discretion” debate, we come full circle.  Here, fiscal 
policy meets political economy; Strategic behaviour explains why 
political parties follow a more moderate fiscal policy. In contrast, Warin: International Fiscal Policy Practices  9 
there is an older political economy view which holds that right-wing 
governments follow tight fiscal policies, and left-wing governments 
follow loose fiscal policies. In another version of this partisan view 
of the political process Borooah and van der Ploeg (1983), argue 
that, in times of political popularity, the government can afford to 
pursue ideological objectives, while under grim re-election 
prospects, the government forsakes ideological concerns and 
concentrates on winning the sympathy of voters. Also, according to 
Rogoff and Sibert (1988), governments implement ideological 
policies during the first few years of office and leave popular 
policies for the last years of office, expecting a positive outcome 
from the following elections. 
 
Due to recessions during the seventies and early eighties, most 
national governments implemented fiscal policies targeting higher 
deficits. Paradoxically, the same governments were unwilling to 
save once the economies were again expanding. To make a parallel 
with monetary policy, these kinds of fiscal policies can be qualified 
as discretionary. 
 
What would be the rule side? Some governments decide their public 
finances by committing themselves to targeting a budget deficit that 
is a certain percentage of national income. An early example was 
the medium-term financial strategy implemented by Mrs. Thatcher 
for the UK. The succession of government cutbacks was pro-
cyclical. Of course, d uring times of  recession tax revenues fall, 
expenditures on unemployment benefits rise, the government deficit 
rises, and then the national income falls. With such a rule, the 
government misses its targets. Moreover, the strategy of c utting 
spending or raising taxes to face the recession throws the economy 
into an even bigger recession. According to van der Ploeg (2004)a 
better fiscal strategy is to set targets for the total tax burden and 
government debt as a fraction of national inco me at the end of the 
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3. Fiscal Policy Practices in General 
 
Fiscal policies in the U.S. 
Over a period covering 1970 to 1997, the budget of the U.S. federal 
government was in deficit. In 1990, the Budget Enforcement Act 
(BEA) considerably reformed the budgetary procedure and set forth 
overall expenditure limits. The “target” – to make a parallel with the 
monetary policy studies – was a balanced federal budget. To ensure 
correct implementation, the BEA creates a procedure  called 
sequestration for discretionary budget items. The goal of this 
procedure is to balance the spending levels with the spending limit. 
If an administration increases the budget deficit above the budget 
cap, Congress provides expenditure authorization i n excess of the 
discretionary spending limit,  but all discretionary spending 
programs are automatically reduced by a common percentage to 
balance the budget. 
 
From 1998 to 2001, budget surpluses replaced deficits, but since 
2002, deficits and, more precisely, rising deficits have replaced the 
four years of surpluses. Why is this so? The federal government 
budget consists of purchases, transfers, and taxes.  
 
First,  federal purchases of goods and services do  not appear to 
change much as real activity in the private economy fluctuates: 
during the post-World War II period, federal spending has 
fluctuated mostly, because of defence spending, and, except for the 
early 1980s, federal spending has not increased during recessions. 
Following the recession of 2001, f ederal purchases in real terms 
increased by 6.4% in 2002. Most of this spending was for the war 
on terrorism (Hall and Papell 2005). 
 
Second, government transfers rise in recessions and fall in booms, 
for the most part through the normal operation of benefit programs. 
 
Third, taxes also rise and fall  with economic activity. In each 
recession since 1959, the federal government tax revenue dropped. 
This was particularly dramatic in the recessions of 1969-70, 1974-
75,  1981-82, and  2001.  A less dramatic example of revenue 
decline occurred during the recession of 1990-91. The drop in tax Warin: International Fiscal Policy Practices  11 
revenue in these periods was larger in percentage terms than the 
drop in real GDP. 
 
Fiscal policies in Great Britain 
As aforementioned, although Great-Britain is the land of Keynes, it 
was keen at following a budgetary rule. Great Britain was the first 
country to implement a multi-year budgeting method, beginning 
this practice in 1961. By considering expenditure decisions in a 
multi-year framework, the target is efficiency. T he means are: 
budgetary discipline, policy rationalization, and expenditure 
efficiency . 
 
In such a multi-year context, policymakers benefit from a medium- 
term view of budgetary policies, allowing them to consider the 
impacts of expenditure commitments for the next years. 
 
In late spring or early summer, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, his 
senior advisors, the heads of the Inland Revenue Service, and the 
Customs and Excise Service set forth the fiscal strategy. The 
timespan they consider is the next three years. This is a multi-year 
period rule. The Cabinet Committee on Public Expenditures 
establishes the Public Expenditure Survey (PES). The PES sets the 
limits for the aggregate and departmental expenditures for the next 
years. The PES is fully integrated into the Financial Statement and 
Budget Report (FSBR) presented to Parliament. 
 
Fiscal policies in Germany 
Germany is a federal state. As such, the annual federal budget is 
preceded by discussions with the states ( Länders) and local 
governments through the  Financial Planning Council 
(Finanzplanungsrat). Headed by the federal Minister of Finance 
and composed of representatives of all three levels of governments, 
the Financial Planning Council seeks a consensus on the target 
levels of expenditure growth, the distribution of public resources, 
and government borrowing for the forthcoming budget year, plus 
the three successive years. The recommendations of the Financial 
Planning Council are not officially compulsory. Hence, the 
effectiveness of the Council relies  largely on two components: on 
the one hand its expertise; and on the other hand its political Warin: International Fiscal Policy Practices  12 
credibility. In practice, the federal Minister of Finance favors 
federal objectives to back the development of national policy. 
 
Fiscal policies in Japan 
Japan is an example of a nation having a discretionary policy 
making system. Public expenditure in the central government 
budget is the usual instrument for a fiscal stimulus. The initial 
central government budget is approved by the Diet in April ( the 
beginning o f the fiscal year). In the fall, the government proposes a 
revised budget. Almost every year since 1965, public expenditure 
has been augmented in the revised budget in the fall. 
 
Precisely, public works expenditure is an important component of 
the mandatory “stimulus package” put together by the Japanese 
government over the last couple of decades. 
 
Discretionary spending in Japan is countercyclical. As shown by 
Bohn (1998), the positive relationship between the primary surplus-
to-output ratio and the ratio  of the stock of national debt to output 
ensures that the long-term government budget constraint will be 
satisfied. This is true for Japan, whose budgetary deterioration in 
the 1970s was followed  by rapid improvement in the 1980s. The 
positive relationship established in the 1980s, however, broke down 
in the 1990s, with a quick deterioration of the budget and the 
resulting increase of the national debt. The yield on Japanese bonds, 
nonetheless, remained quite low - nearly 1 percent during this 
period of fast budgetary deterioration. 
 
 
4. A Special Case: Fiscal Policy Practices in Europe 
 
The European fiscal policy practice is a very special case. Indeed, it 
is a rule -based fiscal policy, assessed on a three-year period. The 
rule is both a deficit and debt target. As a supra-national rule, it is 
compelling for the countries belonging to the Euroland. However, 
since it  is based on three years, the rule allows for some sort of 
discretion. 
 
On March 23rd, 2005 the European Council agreed to introduce 
some flexibility into the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), creating, Warin: International Fiscal Policy Practices  13 
in fact, a SGP II. This flexibility is introduced via the concept of 
“relevant factors,” which are country specific. Nevertheless, six 
years of governance by the Treaty of Maastricht, followed by five 
years under the rules of the SGP seem to adequately demonstrate 
the positive externalities created by the European fiscal packages on 
European countries’ economies. 
 
However, some countries are breaching, or are close to breaching 
the SGP. Using the revised numbers from Eurostat for Greece, the 
latter was always above the 3% deficit ceiling in our sample. 
Portugal’s deficit in 2001 was greater then 3%, followed by 
Germany's and France's from 2002 to 2004, as well as the 
subsequent breaches by Italy, U.K., and The Netherlands in 2004. 
 
The stake is different for countries belonging to the Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU), in light of the necessity for economic 
policy coordination. During the convergence period from 1993 to 
late 1998, it appeared that some coordination rules were needed 
once the first European countries were ready to enter into the EMU. 
To this end, Germany, in 1995, proposed the Stability Pact in order 
to extend the positive effects of the convergence period, and to 
prevent countries from contracting their public spending during this 
period, only to increase it later on. First drafted in Madrid in 1995, 
heavily debated in Florence and Dublin in 1996, and accepted by 
France the same year, the SGP, now backed by the two largest 
countries of the forthcoming EMU, was adopted in Amsterdam in 
1997. 
 
The SGP consists of extensions of the fiscal package of the Treaty 
of Maastricht. To comply with the SGP countries may have a 
budget deficit within 3% of GDP, or public debt lower than 60% of 
GDP, although the latter criterion seems to have a weaker timbre. 
(The 3% rule is less arbitrary than people sometimes believe. With 
an average nominal growth rate of 5%, and a targeted inflation of 
2%, the real growth rate of 3% would balance the deficit of 3% of 
GDP).  
 
Of the three formal elements of which the SGP consists, the first is 
political. The pact is a political commitment by all parties involved 
in the SGP (Commission, Member States, Council) to the full and Warin: International Fiscal Policy Practices  14 
timely implementation of the budget surveillance process (European 
Council (1997a). 
 
Second, there are preventive elements (European Council (1997c): 
(1) all Member States implement stability and convergence 
programmes; (2) there exists the possibility to trigger the “early 
warning” mechanism in the event of a significant slippage in the 
budgetary position of a Member State. The European Commission 
then makes recommendations to the Council. This has happened 
four times: 01/30/2002 for Portugal, and Germany; 11/19/2002 for 
France; and 04/28/2004 for Italy. 
 
Third, there are dissuasive elements (European Council 1997b), 
which require Member States to take immediate corrective action 
and, if necessary, allow for the imposition of sanctions. If a country 
breaches the SGP, it exposes itself to penalties. These penalties are 
embodied in the SGP through article 104c of the Treaty of 
Maastricht via compulsory deposits that, after time, can be 
transformed into fines if governments do not take measures to 
decrease their deficits. The non-interest bearing deposits a re made 
up of two elements: a fixed sum equal to 0.2% of GDP and a 
supplement of 0.1% of GDP for every percentage point by which 
the budget deficit exceeds the 3% reference level. Derogation is 
possible for “exceptional and temporary” circumstances, 
particularly in the case of a negative annual real growth rate. The 
exemption is automatic for countries if their GDP has declined by at 
least 2%, and if the excess deficit is temporary and small. Those 
countries in which the GDP has declined between 0.75% and 2 % 
can also gain exemption from the rule with the consent of the 
Council. In the new definition of the SGP, “relevant factors” will 
also be considered. When taking into account “relevant factors” - 
which are already in the Treaty and have to be used in a balanced 
overall assessment - the decision whether an excessive deficit exists 
will be fully conditional on the overarching principle that, before 
these factors are taken into account, the excess over the reference 
value has to be temporary, and the deficit has to remain close to the 
reference value. Further, those relevant factors may not be invoked 
to put an end to an excessive deficit procedure. More emphasis will 
be placed on debt developments and sustainability. 
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According to revised budget figures, Greece always breached the 
deficit ceiling in our sample. The stakes are high. The SGP has been 
justified by the economic literature in many ways. 
 
The rationale of the Stability and Growth Pact 
Firstly, several researchers deal with the question of the 
sustainability of the budget deficit (Bohn 1995, Mongelli 1999, 
Nielsen 1992, Perotti, et al. 1998),  the bottom line of  which  is 
preventing idle governments from hampering European growth. 
Amador (1999) emphasized both the role of fiscal policy, and the 
behavior of the budget deficit and the public debt over time; an 
important feature of this model was the defining of sources of 
uncertainty as “stochastic processes.” It is interesting to notice that 
the deficit as a percentage of GDP, excluding debt interest, is close 
to zero or even positive (a surplus) for almost all the euro area 
members. What pushes countries like France, Germany, and Greece 
below the 3% deficit ceiling is the debt interest. 
 
Secondly, Beetsma (2001) develops a policy-mix argument, with 
other supporters of the SGP asserting that the advent of a central 
monetary authority was important in establishing the correct mix of 
fiscal and monetary policy in the Euro-zone (Issing 2002). 
 
Thirdly, and different slightly, is the question of fiscal coordination 
among member countries. Here, the issue is not coordinating the 
monetary policy with a country-specific fiscal policy, but rather 
coordinating fiscal policies collectively. A lack of coordination 
could lead to asymmetric economic shocks on both the aggregate 
demand and aggregate supply in every country, as well as hinder the 
European convergence. However, coordination is not synonymous 
with convergence (Krugman 1993). 
 
Fourth is the matter of free-riding. Uhlig (2002) focused his 
discussion of free-riding and the SGP on the effects of centralized 
monetary policy combined with decentralized fiscal policy. Uhlig 
regards the SGP as essential in preventing free-riding in the form of 
excessively high deficits. The cause for concern over debt levels 
hinges on the independence of the central bank, because excessive 
levels of debt might lead to a crisis in which the ECB might be 
morally, although not legally, bound to bail out insolvent countries. Warin: International Fiscal Policy Practices  16 
This defense of the SGP is not, however, without its opponents; a 
large share of the literature dissects the relationship between 
centralized monetary and decentralized fiscal policymakers, and 
finds that the SGP might not be needed under some conditions 
(Fourçans and Warin 2000, Leith and Wren-Lewis 2002, Vranceanu 
and Warin 2001). 
 
The fifth issue is moral hazard, which differs from free riding to the 
extent that it is “post-contractual opportunism.” In other words, 
once the pact is signed, countries’ loss functions change. Dixit 
(2001), and Dixit and Lambertini (2001) demonstrate that fiscal 
discretion leads to equilibrium levels of output and inflation far 
different than Pareto-optimal choices. 
 
The sixth consideration is structural externalities. In order to abide 
by the fiscal rules of the SGP, countries are forced to make needed 
structural reforms (Warin 2005). These changes occur in the form 
of how much and how governments raise taxes, and how much and 
how they allocate public expenditures.  
 
A seventh reason is the maintenance of the credibility of the 
European c entral bank through insuring its leadership as the 
monetary authority. As noted by Buti and Van den Noord (2004), 
the EMU is, “[commonly] seen as a regime of monetary leadership 
where fiscal policy is to support the central bank in its task to keep 
inflation in check.” This power is drawn from the following 
European Council resolution which accompanies the Pact: “[it] is 
also necessary to ensure that national budgetary policies support 
stability oriented monetary policies.” When the Maastricht Treaty 
was drafted, many observers believed that the European budgetary 
situation could undermine the credibility of the future European 
Central Bank (Beetsma and Bovenberg 1995). If a country's fiscal 
situation becomes unsustainable, other countries might be forced to 
bail out of the insolvent national government. Alternatively, the 
European Central Bank may be forced to monetize national debts, 
and in so doing, create additional inflation in the EU. Bolt (1999) 
summarizes this argument stating that, “It is in [the following] 
context that the Pact for Stability and Growth must be regarded: it 
seeks to supplement the common monetary policy framework 
within EMU with sound fiscal policies by the Member States so as Warin: International Fiscal Policy Practices  17 
to relieve the burden on the ECB’s monetary policy and to leave 
room for the operation of the automatic stabilizers.”1 Cooper and 
Kempf (2000), nonetheless, call for some flexibility at the fiscal 
level, as the central bank lacks the tools necessary for stabilization 
in the presence of country specific shocks. 
 
In retrospect, the SGP does not seem to provide an effective answer 
to the seven branches of the literature studying the potential need 
for a fiscal rule. This is not surprising, since the SGP is more a 
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